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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM

possible that the Court has adopted only part of the rule of Rea v. Rea and
will permit non-disclosure of any independent investigation only when there
has been express stipulation. It appears that no certain explanation can be given.
A. D.
INSURANCE
JuRY TRIAL WAIVED BY LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY THROUGH DILATORY
TACTICS

The insured died approximately nine months after he took out a life policy
in October 1959. The policy contained a clause making it incontestable by the
insurer two years after the date of issue. The insurer notified the beneficiaries
by letter in September 1960, some thirteen months prior to the expiration of the
period of contestability, of its intent to rescind the policy due to alleged fraud
and misrepresentation by the insured in his application for insurance. Subsequently the insurer began a suit for rescission with service of complaint, after
a month of attempting service, on April 25, 1961, seven months after the
notice. The beneficiaries submitted in answer a general denial and a counterclaim demanding that the policy be declared valid and the insurer be declared
liable to them for the face value of the policy. They later moved for a separate
trial of the factual issues raised by the counterclaim and for a stay of the
equity action pending the outcome of the jury trial. The Court of Appeals
held that the Appellate Division1 had not abused its discretion in reversing
the Supreme Court, Special Term order granting the motion. It stated that the
beneficiaries had waived a jury by dilatory tactics in not initiating a suit at
law during the seven months between notice by the insurer and commencement
of the suit in equity. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Conway,
11 N.Y.2d 367, 183 N.E.2d 754, 229 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1962).
The Appellate Division generally has the same discretionary powers as
does the lower branch of the Supreme Court; it may reverse on review any2
discretionary decision of that court even where no abuse of its powers is found.
3
Iowever, a reversal without a finding of abuse is rare. The background of the
entire area of litigation between an insurer and the beneficiaries of the insured
4
under a life policy containing an incontestability clause must be viewed in
light of the basic apprehensive view of juries taken towards insurance carriers.
A number of similar New York cases indicate the common practice of a carrier
of bringing a suit for rescission in equity quickly, or without adequate notice
1. 15 A.D.2d 924, 225 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2d Dep't 1962).
2. O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 (1956); Hogan v. Franken,
221 App. Div. 164, 223 N.Y. Supp. 1 (3d Dep't 1927); 9 Carmody-Wait 573 and cases
footnoted.
3. Hogan v. Franken, supra note 2.
4. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 155(1) (b) for statutory discussion of incontestability clauses.
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to the insured, in order to have the issues litigated by a court without a jury.5
On the other hand, beneficiaries under such policies often delay action on their
claims, taking advantage of the six-year contract statute of limitations, in the
hope that the insurer will not contest the policy within the stipulated period
of contestability, in order to avoid defenses of fraud or misrepresentation. 0
In every suit where the beneficiaries have delayed, the question arises as to
whether the delay is innocent or is evidence of maneuvering of this nature.
The beneficiaries are entitled to a trial by jury of the issues of fact
involved, though this right may be waived.8 The jury trial may be obtained
by bringing a suit at law on the policy. However, as mentioned above, the
insurer is at the disadvantage if he must await a legal action by the beneficiaries since he is pressed by the impending expiration of the time allowed
him to contest the policy upon any ground other than the failure of the insured
to pay premiums. The only recourse is an equitable action for rescission, prior to
which he is required to provide the beneficiaries, by notice, sufficient time to
institute an action at law. This notice does not suspend the running of the
contestability period, as only the commencement of a court action is considered a contest.9 The beneficiaries may further attempt to obtain a jury
trial upon any factual issues presented by their counterclaim in the suit for
rescission by motion, as in the instant case. The granting of this motion is a
matter within the discretion of the court where the counterclaim arises under
the same transaction.' 0 It is here that the actions of both parties must be
carefully weighed, and discretion exercised in favor of the innocent, or less
culpable, party. Also discretionary with the court is the order of trial of the
actions, should the motion be granted. Subdivisions (2) and (3) of section
443 of the Civil Practice Act provide that the Court, in its discretion, may
order a separate trial between the plaintiff and one or more defendants of any
issue of fact prior to other issues in the case.
The Appellate Division stated two bases for its reversal of the Special
Term order in the instant case: first, that the beneficiaries, in failing to commence an action at law within the seven-month period between notice and
service, had waived a jury trial; and second, that the rescission action having
been begun first, should be tried first. The Court of Appeals discussed only
the first point in affirming. The Haney case, cited by the Appellate Division in
5. See generally Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 160 Misc. 543, 290 N.Y. Supp. 891
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marzec, 146 Misc. 26, 262 N.Y. Supp. 558

(Sup. Ct. 1932).

6. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Haney, 163 Misc. 179, 296 N.Y. Supp. 576

(Sup. Ct. 1937).
7. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kessler, supra note 5; N.Y. Ins. Law, supra note 4.
8. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 426; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Haney, supra
note 6.
9. Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 44, 166 N.E. 798 (1929).
10. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. hammerstein Opera Co., 184 App. Div. 440, 171
N.Y. Supp. 678 (1st Dep't 1918); see Di Menna v. Cooper and Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391,
115 N.E. 993 (1917).
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support of its first point, is quite similar factually. The court stated: "Having
by her own maneuvering forced the company to resort to an,action in equity,
the beneficiary should not now complain if she has lost her right to a jury
trial, and she has lost it."'" The Appellate Division was convinced that the
failure to act, although the brevity of the majority opinion leaves scant room
for close analysis, indicates such maneuvering. The Court of Appeals arrived
at the same conclusion in the instant case in holding that the denial of a jury
trial was not an abuse of discretion. It was stated that the company's notice
was adequate warning to the beneficiaries to begin an action if a jury trial
were desired, and that a failure to do so could justifiably be taken as indicative
of an intent to outmaneuver the insurance company. The instant case is a
rare example of the denial of trial by jury to a beneficiary where there has
been no express waiver of that right. Waiver normally depends not upon the
failure to act, other than failure to assert this right at the pleading stage, but
upon the intention of the party. It is an intentional abandonment and should
2
not be found in acts evidencing negligence or oversight rather than intent.'
Here it is held that a party may ivaive trial by jury even prior to the pleading
stage, that is, by failing to bring a legal action, a new theory as expounded
by the Court of Appeals. Section 426 of the Civil Practice Act establishes no
such ground for finding a waiver, nor does it list any manner of waiver before
the suit is initiated. It would seem incumbent upon the courts to find an
intentional act only where a party has had an opportunity to manifest the
intent in a manner prescribed by law or in some other definite form. The instant
decision is further weakened by the reversal by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court, indicating, without stating, an abuse of that court's discretion
in granting the motion. Were the decision based upon a reversal of an exercise
of sound discretion, as it seems to have been viewed by the Court of Appeals,
it would have been more unfortunate. In any case, the Appellate Division
spells out no abuse, and the Court of Appeals states that no such expression
is necessary.
That the plaintiff insurer is not here an anticipatory defendant cannot
be doubted when the events are viewed in the light of the time limit imposed
upon it and its own delay in bringing suit. The same result might have been
obtained, however, in a more expeditious and less harmful manner by affirming
only the Appellate Division's decision as to the order of trial. No waiver need
have been found, and only the integrity of the Special Term, in its exercise
of discretion, would have been offended. Res judicata on the issues decided in
the equity suit would have, for all practical purposes, disposed of the issues
to be tried in the jury action. That action would probably never have reached
trial. But, the right of the beneficiaries to a jury trial would not have been
11. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Haney, supra note 6, at 182, 296 N.Y. Supp.
at 579.
12. Alsens American Portland Cement Works v. Degnon Const. Co., 222 N.Y. 34,
118 N.E. 210 (1917).
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impugned by the finding of an entirely new breed of waiver. Usually the courts
are intent upon the protection of the beneficiary from the "maneuverings" of
the insurance companies in their attempts to avoid a jury trial. Viewing the
sequence of events, especially the difficulty of effecting service upon the beneficiaries as emphasized by the Court of Appeals, it is not difficult to conclude
that an element of "maneuvering" may have guided the beneficiaries. Both
courts on appeal groped for precedent, finding it in a 1937 New York Supreme
Court decision' 3 and a United States Supreme Court case, American Life
Insurance Co. v. Stewart,14 in which the parties had waived a jury by stipulation. A further federal case, Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover,"5 is mentioned
by the Court of Appeals. This case is quite explicit in its view that, in federal
courts, a jury trial, where one is required, should be preserved wherever
possible by exercising the discretion of the court in deciding the sequence of
trial of legal and equitable claims in a narrow and restricted manner. In fact,
neither of the federal opinions cited by the Court of Appeals immediately
following the discovery of a waiver in the instant case, involves a waiver but
discusses sequence of trial of legal and equitable claims. But this is New York;
the case is not in a federal court, there is no seventh amendment, and the
right to a jury trial is not nearly as well protected if this case is to be a guide.
The holding should find wide application in the numerous suits of this
nature which arise, and must be viewed by insurance carriers as advantageous
in avoiding the pitfalls of jury verdicts. To the beneficiary and his attorney,
the rule places a higher premium upon prompt action in the face of impending
litigation at the instance of an insurer.
R.S.M.
LABOR LAW
DISSOLUTION OF FEDERALLY AUTHORIZED WELFARE FUND BY STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE UPHELD

A welfare fund for the benefit of union members was established pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement, entailing contributions by the employer
to the fund, and which was to be administered by a committee. Subsequent
to a labor dispute and a resultant work stoppage, the employer ceased business
operations. One year later the trustees of the fund notified the State Insurance
Department of their intention to continue to benefit the members of the union
until the assets of the fund were expended. The Director of Insurance asserted
that since the trustees were themselves commencing a voluntary liquidation,
he had an obligation to take possession and proceed with the liquidation. He
applied for an order authorizing this action which was granted by the Supreme
13. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Haney, supra note 6.

14. 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
15. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).

